Selection and negotiation of purchasing bids is a complex decision making process that requires consideration of a variety of vendor attributes such as price, delivery performance, and quality. Several decision models have been utilized for vendor evaluation and selection. Talluri [EUR. J. Operat. Res. 143 (1) (2002) 171] and Zhu [EUR. J. Operat. Res. 154(2004) 150] propose a buyer -seller game model that evaluate the efficiency of alternative bids with respect to the ideal target set by the buyer. We prove some theorem in the current paper about this model. The bids cannot be easily evaluated and selected, while inputs and outputs each vary in interval. In this paper, presenting a new idea for evaluating the bids with interval data, an interval will be defined for the efficiency score of each bid. And finally, a method for selecting bids by the obtained efficiency interval is presented. And, the new technique will be applied to a set of real data.
Introduction
As pointed out by Wise and Morrison (2000) , one of the major flaws in the current business -to -business (B2B) model is that it focuses on price -driven transactions between buyers and sellers. In fact, a number of efficiency -based on negotiation models have been developed to deal with multiple attributesinputs and outputs. For example, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used by Weber and Desai (1996) and Weber et al. (1998) to develop models for vendor evaluation and negotiation. Vijayan (2000) discusses the importance of considering multiple vendor related attributes. It is suggested by him that companies are developing software that is considering several factors beyond price for effective B2B transactions.
Based on a survey of 170 purchasing managers, Dickson (1966) suggested that cost, quality, and delivery performance are the three most important criteria in vendor evaluatoin. Willis et al. (1993) proposed a classification of vendor performance evaluation models that included categorical, weighted points, and cost ratio approaches. Weber and Desai (1996) and Weber et al. (1998) identified two articles about decision models for vendor evaluation and negotiation bids.
In this paper, we review the models of Talluri (2002) and Zhu (2004) and prove some theorem.
In the recent years, models are observed to have inputs and outputs as interval. In this paper, an interval will be defined for each bid's efficiency score, and a method for selecting bids by the obtained efficiencie's interval is presented.
This paper consists of the following sections: In section 2, the models in Talluri (2002) and Zhu (2004) are discussed and some theorems are proved. In section 3, this model with interval data is presented. One example with real interval data is provided. Finally, the conclusion is given.
Models introduce
In this section, we review the models of Talluri (2002) and Zhu (2004) . Since the evaluations in these models are conducted from a buyer's perspective, inputs are defined as the resources spent and outputs as the benefits derived by the buyer. The scenario include single input -single output, single inputmultiple output and multiple input -multiple output cases.
Case1 (single input -single output) Expression (1) depicts the model.
Then, when we have single input -single output, there is no require of the weights.
Case2 (single input -multiple output with simultaneous consideration of n vendor bids) The model of Zhu (2004) is shown in (2) .
s r=1
Where n represents the number of bids. 
Where p represents the vendor being evaluated. This model is a linear programming. Case 4 (multiple input -multiple output with simultaneous consideration of n vendor bids) Expression (4) depicts the model.
Where m represents the number of bid's inputs and b i represent unknown input weights. This model is non -linear programming. Talluri ar(
", but the objective function isn't equal to this expression, and this model isn't converted to a linear program. Case 5 (multiple input -multiple output with individual consideration of n vendor bids) Expression (5) depicts the model.
This model by replacing the objective function's denominator with 1 t is transformed to a linear form.
Theorem 2.1 Optimal value of objective function in (4) is less than or equal to objective function's optimal value in (5).
Proof: Assume (a, b) to be optimal solution for objective function in (4), thus: e p = ayp bxp . obviously (a, b) is a feasible solution for (5) . Then the optimal solution of (4) is less than or equal to optimal solution of (5).
Integer programming model for bid selection
The vendor ratings are evaluated in a 0 -1 integer programming model, shown in expression (5) .
Where z j is the binary variable that represents the selection status of vendor bid j, θ j is the efficiency of vendor bid j, θ avg is average efficiency target, q j is the amount ordered from vendor j, D is the buyer's demand requirement, c jmax is the capacity of vendor j, o jmin is the minimum order quantity requirement of vendor j.
Theorem 2.2 z 0 > 0 for all feasible solution in (6).
Proof: Since z j ∈ {0, 1} for every j, thus z 0 > 0 or z 0 = 0. Let z 0 = 0, then z j = 0 for every j. From q j − o jmin z j ≥ 0 we have q j ≥ 0, and from q j −c jmax z j ≤ 0, we have q j ≤ 0, therefore q j = 0, that contradicts (5) the vendor that has efficiency score 1, in (6) related z j is 1.
Theorem 2.3 Let in bids we have at least one nonideal vendor, then in

Proof:
Since there exist DMU t subject to θ t < 1, so
θ j n = θ avg . Now assume to the contrary that θ p = 1 and z p = 0, then:
This contradictions complete the proof, and if θ p = 1 then certainly z p = 1 . 
Buyer -seller game model with interval data
Case (3) with interval data
The following pair of LP models has been developed to generate the upper and lower bounds of interval efficiency for each vendor. 
The dual of models (3) and (7) and (8) are as follows, respectively: (7) and (8) (4) and (5) we have:
Theorem 3.3 In models (3) and
Which means (θ, λ) is also a feasible solution to model (10), so we get e l p ≤ e p . Now, if (θ , λ ) is the optimal solution to model (11) similary, is proved that θ ≥ 0 and (1 − λ p ) ≥ 0. Then the following inequalities hold:
It is obvious that (θ , λ ) is a feasible solution of model (9 
Case (5) with interval data
The upper and lower bounds of the relative efficiency of DMU p in (5) 
Consider dual of models: Proof: Consider linear form of (5), since in optimal solution we have: 
Integer programming model for bid selection with interval data
The following pair of IP models have been constructed to select an optimal set of bids for models (7) and (8) or (12) and (13). 
Application example
We now apply this approach to a byer of food's products (for one goods) in Iran. There are 4 vendors in this district. Product price, quality and service time are considered to be the three most important factors in evaluating vendors. Price is utilized as the input, and quality and service time are considered as outputs. In table 1 the interval input and interval outputs for these DMU s are given. It is evident from these result that vendor 4 is the best performer. The demand for the buyer is 1500 kg. We utilize the efficiency scores obtained in a 0 -1 integer programming models shown in expressions (19) and (20). The results are shown in Table 4 and 5. Then Z = (0, 0, 0, 1) or Z = (1, 0, 0, 0) and Q = (0, 0, 0, 1500) or Q = (1500, 0, 0, 0). In the present case scenario, one vendor needs to be selected because of the demand requirements.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have reviewed models of Talluri (2002) and Zhu (2004) . Some theorems about this models are proved. We have developed a new pair of models for dealing with interval data in every case. By solving these models an interval will be defined for the efficiency score. The model evaluations are integrated into a new pair of 0 -1 integer programming formulation in determining the optimal set of vendors to be selected in meeting the demand requirements of the buyer without violating the minimum order necessities of the vendors. If case (2) and case (4) have interval input and output, for finding each vendor's interval efficiency can solve one problem that optimizes the sum of all of the efficiencies in their lower and upper bounds. One can prevent a big difference between the weights by applying weight control on models made in this paper.
